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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
David Vogel appeals from the district court's judgment summarily dismissing the
claim contained in his verified, Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. On appeal,
he asserts that the district court abused its discretion and violated his substantial rights
when it denied his motion to retest the suspected drugs in this case.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the underlying criminal case, Mr. Vogel pied guilty to possession of a
controlled substance for residue found on a glass tube. (R., pp.11-13.) Mr. Vogel then
filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief and affidavit in which he raised a number
of claims, 1 only one of which is relevant on appeal.

That claim concerned "New

Information from the Idaho State Drug lab." (R., pp.11-12.) In his affidavit, Mr. Vogel
explained that he had received notification that there were irregularities and misconduct
at the Idaho State Police forensics laboratory, including conduct involving deception and
the hiding of controlled substances.

He opined, "I beleive [sic] that residual residue

could come from a not cleaned environment or from mishandled lab technicians." (R.,
p.16.)
Post-conviction counsel was appointed (R., p.31 ), and filed an Affidavit of
Counsel to which he attached two exhibits. (R., p.36.) Those exhibits were a letter sent
to Idaho prosecutors concerning "intentional deception" on the part of Lamora Lewis, an

The other claims concerned allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, including a
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the evidence be retested.
(R., pp.12-13.)
1
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Idaho State Laboratory forensic analyst, and a copy of the Controlled Substance
Analysis conducted in Mr. Vogel's criminal case, showing that it was conducted by
Ms. Lewis. (R., pp.39-42.) Mr. Vogel then filed a Motion to Vacate Underlying Criminal
Conviction and Sentence "based upon misconduct by the technician at the Idaho State
Lab in testing the alleged controlled substance." (R., p.44.)
The State then filed a motion, along with a supporting brief, seeking summary
dismissal or summary disposition "on the general basis that" Mr. Vogel's "claim(s) are
too bare or conclusory" and because his "ineffective assistance of counsel claim(s) fail
to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding both deficient performance and
resulting prejudice." (R., pp.46-59.) In an Affidavit of the Petitioner filed in response to
the State's motion for summary dismissal, Mr. Vogel stated, inter a/ia, that he "believe[d]
the test [results] to be wrong" and "[t]o the best of my knowledge the tube in question
did not have controlled substances in it." (R., pp.62-63.)
The district court granted the State's motion for summary dismissal of the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

(R., pp.69-75.) However, it gave Mr. Vogel

permission to file an amended petition for post-conviction relief with respect to his claim
concerning misconduct at the State crime laboratory. (R., p.67.) Mr. Vogel then filed a
verified, Amended Petition (R., pp.77-80), in which he explained that his claim was
based on the following facts:
a.)

New information regarding the Idaho State Drug Lab indicating
that the technician testing the substance involved in my case, has
admitted to wrong doing while employed at the Idaho State Drug
Lab.

b.)

That I do not believe that the item tested positive for residue as the
item was never used for the ingestion of drugs.
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c.)

That I asked my attorney for a second test, but a second test was
not conducted. I believe that second test would prove that the
State Lab results are tainted.

d.)

That the only reason that I pied was because the State Lab results
showed that the item tested positive for methamphetamine, and I
felt that I would therefore have no defense.

(R., p.78.)
The State filed an Answer containing the boilerplate affirmative defenses
available under the post-conviction statute.

(R., pp.82-85.)

The State then filed an

amended motion for summary dismissal and a brief in support of that motion in which it
argued that the claim was "too bare or conclusory" and did not raise a genuine issue of
material fact. (R., pp.86-96.)
Mr. Vogel then filed a motion requesting that the. evidence in his case be
retested, at the State's expense pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4904, for the presence of
controlled substances.

(Motion for Testing. 2 )

The State objected to the request,

arguing that it "is essentially a request for post-conviction relief," and that such a motion
should not be granted until and unless the State's motion for summary dismissal was
ruled on. (R., pp.105-06.)
At the hearing on the Motion for Testing, the district court engaged in a colloquy
with post-conviction counsel, explaining that it needed an explanation as to "the
statutory or case law basis for the testing - the request to test this particular drug pipe, I
guess, at this point. What is the authority for conducting an independent test at this
time on that item?" (Tr., p.27, L.18 - p.28, L.5.) In response to this inquiry for legal

A file-stamped copy of the Motion for Testing is attached to a Motion to Augment filed
contemporaneously with this brief.
2
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authority authorizing such testing, post-conviction counsel explained, "I don't have any."
(Tr., p.28, L.6.) The district court denied the motion, reasoning, "well, for the reasons
stated previously in my comments to [post-conviction counsel], I don't believe that there
is a basis at this point for a separate and independent test of the drug pipe, even if it
does [still] exist." (Tr., p.30, Ls.11-14.)
Later, the district court granted the State's motion for summary disposition of the
claim raised in the Amended Petition.

In doing so, the district court appears to have

misunderstood the claim raised in the Amended Petition, believing it to have been a
restatement of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that was previously
summarily dismissed. 3 In its order, the district court explained,
[T]his claim is still bare, conclusory, and unsubstantiated. Mr. Vogel has
not provided admissible evidence to show that the test performed on the
substance in the underlying criminal case was flawed, tainted, or rendered
unreliable by misconduct at the Idaho State Police Forensics Laboratory.
He has not provided admissible evidence to show any probability that a
second test would have produced different results. Without this evidence,
there has been now showing that Mr. Vogel's attorney's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness ....
(R., pp.119-20.)

The district court then issued a judgment dismissing Mr. Vogel's

Amended Petition. (R., p.114.)
Mr. Vogel filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment summarily dismissing
his Amended Petition. (R., p.128.)

The misunderstanding is understandable in light of post-conviction counsel's own
apparent confusion as to what issues he was litigating. (R., pp.100-03 (Brief of postconviction counsel attempting to respond to the State's motion for summary dismissal of
the non-ineffective assistance of counsel claim in which post-conviction counsel only
discusses the previously-dismissed ineffective assistance of counsel claims).)
Regardless of the misunderstanding, the district court's dismissal was based on the lack
of any information showing that the pipe would have retested ·negative for drugs.
3
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion and violate Mr. Vogel's substantial rights, when
it denied his request to retest the evidence based on its mistaken belief that there was
no lawful authority to order such testing?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Vogel's Request To Retest
The Evidence Based On Its Mistaken Belief That There Was No Lawful Authority To
Order Such Testing And Violated His Substantial Rights When It Denied His Request
Despite Evidence Suggesting Flaws In The Testing

A.

Introduction
Mr. Vogel asserts that the district court abused its discretion and violated his

substantial rights when it denied his request to retest the evidence. Because there is
lawful authority to order such testing, the district court abused its discretion when it
denied Mr. Vogel's Motion for Testing.

Additionally, because Mr. Vogel produced

evidence that the person who performed the test in his case has admitted to engaging
in "intentional deception" in her work at the State's crime laboratory, the district court
violated his substantial rights when it denied his Motion for Testing.
B.

Standard Of Review
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court

engages in a three part inquiry to determine whether that discretion was abused. First,
the district court must have perceived the issue as one of discretion.

Second, the

district court must have acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any applicable legal standards.
reached its decision in an exercise of reason.

Third, the district court must have

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600

(1989),
C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Vogel's Request To
Retest The Evidence Based On Its Mistaken Belief That There Was No Lawful
Authority To Order Such Testing And Violated His Substantial Rights When It
Denied His Request Despite Evidence Suggesting Flaws In The Testing
Idaho Code § 19-4904 provides:
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If the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of
representation, including stenographic, printing, witness fees and
expenses, and legal services, these costs and expenses, and a courtappointed attorney may be made available to the applicant in the
preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on appeal, and paid,
on order of the district court, by the county in which the application is filed.
1.C. § 19-4904.
While post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature, "the provisions for
discovery in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shall not apply to the proceedings
unless and only to the extent ordered by the trial court." I.C.R. 57(b). "The decision to
authorize discovery during post-conviction relief is a matter left to the sound discretion
of the district court."

Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605 (2001) (citations

omitted). "Unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant's substantial rights, the
district court is not required to order discovery." Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals has
explained that "failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful
opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process."
Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Abbott v. State, 129
Idaho 381, 385 (Ct. App. 1996)).
In Raudebaugh, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief following his
conviction for second degree murder following a jury trial. Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at
603. Raudebaugh claimed, inter alia, that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to
have the murder weapon (a knife) tested for fingerprints by a defense expert after the
State's expert found no fingerprints, including Raudebaugh's, on the knife.

In

attempting to support the prejudice prong of that claim, Raudebaugh unsuccessfully
sought release of the knife to his expert for analysis.

Id. at 604.

In summarily

dismissing Raudebaugh's claim, after denying his request to test the knife, the district
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court reasoned that the prejudice prong had not been satisfied because he "made only
conclusory and speculative assertions as to what testimony an independent investigator
or expert witness might have provided at trial." Id. at 604-05.
At the outset of its analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted Idaho Criminal
Rule 57(b), which provides that "provisions for discovery in the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure shall not apply to the proceedings [in post-conviction] unless and only to the
extent ordered by the trial court." Id. at 605 (quoting I.C.R. 57(b)).

The Court then

explained, "[t]he decision to authorize discovery during post-conviction relief is a matter
left to the sound discretion of the district court. Unless discovery is necessary to protect
an applicant's substantial rights, the district court is not required to order discovery." Id.
(citations omitted). In upholding the district court's denial of Raudebaugh's request for
testing of the knife prior to ruling on the State's motion for summary dismissal, the Court
reasoned that Raudebaugh had made "no showing that the state's testing was flawed or
that there is new technology that would make current testing more reliable."
Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 605.

In Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals
considered the denial of a post-conviction petitioner's request for retention of an expert
pathologist to provide support for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning
the failure to obtain an expert pathologist to testify at a murder trial. The key facts in
Murphy were that, for the four years preceding trial, including during testimony before

the grand jury, the State's pathologist maintained that suicide was a possible cause of
death.

Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148.

Then, "the night before the trial," the State's

pathologist changed his opinion after reviewing a gunshot residue report, concluding
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that the "gunshot wound could not have been self-inflicted."

Id.

Finding "that the

allegations on the prejudice prong certainly go beyond speculation" and that "[t]he
record before us raises serious questions on the reliability of Dr. Patterson's opinion
concerning the manner of death that can only be addressed by an expert interpreting all
the relevant facts and reports produced on this question," the Court of Appeals held that
"the I.C. § 19-4904 motion for funding to retain an expert witness should have been
granted to protect Murphy's substantial right to effective assistance of counsel" and that
"[t]he district court erred in summarily dismissing the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel without first granting Murphy the opportunity to consult with a forensic
pathologist." Id. at 149.
Significant differences exist between the facts in Raudebaugh and the facts of
Mr. Vogel's case, namely, Mr. Vogel has established that the crime laboratory
employee, Lamora Lewis, who tested the evidence in his case has admitted to engaging
in "intentional deception" while working at the laboratory.

(R., pp.40-42.)

In light of

those differences, his case is more akin to Murphy in that he has demonstrated that the
new information concerning the State's expert's dishonesty while employed by the crime
laboratory necessitates retesting.

The Idaho State Police summarized Ms. Lewis'

misconduct while employed at the facility as follows:
On February 23, 2011, at approximately 4:45 p.m., ISP Headquarters Lab
Manager Skyler Anderson and Region 5 Lab Manager Shannon Larson
had a telephone conversation. Mr. Anderson told Ms. Larson that there
was a box of drugs in the Region 5 Lab that was used for "tours" and
"show and tell." He also told Ms. Larson that the drugs in the box were not
tracked and were untraceable. He told her the box of drugs might be in
the vault, but since there was an audit coming up, it might be somewhere
else. Mr. Anderson told Ms. Larson that Lamora Lewis would know where
the box was. When Ms. Larson asked Ms. Lewis about the box of drugs
that was used for "tours," Ms. Lewis climbed up on the drug bench, lifted
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the ceiling tiles, and pulled out a box of drugs. When interviewed, she
explained how she became involved in this intentional deception. She
stated that she knew that intentionally hiding the box from auditors was
wrong and stated "because if you are hiding it obviously something is
wrong, but I know I should have said something."
(R., p.40 (emphasis added).) In light of the admitted dishonest conduct on the part of

Ms.

Lewis, including her having unrestricted access to untraceable controlled

substances near the bench where she conducted the testing in this case, Mr. Vogel has
made a sufficient demonstration of potential flaws in the testing of the evidence in his
case.

Depriving him of the opportunity to provide additional evidence of the flawed

nature of the testing violated Mr. Vogel's substantial rights.
Furthermore, the district court did not recognize that it had discretion to grant or
deny Mr. Vogel's Motion for Testing, and did not know that it had the lawful authority to
grant the motion. Specifically, after asking for any lawful authority to allow it to grant the
motion and receiving no such authority from post-conviction counsel, the district court
denied the motion, explaining, "[w]ell, for the reasons stated previously in my comments
to [post-conviction counsel], I don't believe that there is a basis at this point for a
separate and independent test of the drug pipe, even if it does [still] exist." (Tr., p.30,
Ls.11-14.) It is clear from the record that the district court did not recognize that there
was a legal basis for granting Mr. Vogel's Motion for Testing and that it did not
understand that the decision was one within its discretion .. As such, the district court
abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Vogel's Motion for Testing.
Because the district court both abused its discretion and violated Mr. Vogel's
substantial rights when it denied his Motion for Testing, both its order denying his
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motion and its judgment summarily dismissing his Amended Petition must be vacated,
with this matter remanded for entry of an order allowing retesting of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Vogel respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the order denying his Motion for Testing and the judgment summarily dismissing
his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and remand this matter for the district
court to enter an order granting his Motion for Testing.
rd

DATED this 3 day of April, 2013.

\
SPENCER J. HAHN
D~putfState Appellate Public Defender
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